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Double coupling: modeling subjectivity and asymmetric organization in
social-ecological systems
David Manuel-Navarrete 1
ABSTRACT. Social-ecological organization is a multidimensional phenomenon that combines material and symbolic processes.
However, the coupling between social and ecological subsystem is often conceptualized as purely material, thus reducing the symbolic
dimension to its behavioral and actionable expressions. In this paper I conceptualize social-ecological systems as doubly coupled. On
the one hand, material expressions of socio-cultural processes affect and are affected by ecological dynamics. On the other hand,
coupled social-ecological material dynamics are concurrently coupled with subjective dynamics via coding, decoding, personal
experience, and human agency. This second coupling operates across two organizationally heterogeneous dimensions: material and
symbolic. Although resilience thinking builds on the recognition of organizational asymmetry between living and nonliving systems,
it has overlooked the equivalent asymmetry between ecological and socio-cultural subsystems. Three guiding concepts are proposed
to formalize double coupling. The first one, social-ecological asymmetry, expands on past seminal work on ecological self-organization
to incorporate reflexivity and subjectivity in social-ecological modeling. Organizational asymmetry is based in the distinction between
social rules, which are symbolically produced and changed through human agents’ reflexivity and purpose, and biophysical rules, which
are determined by functional relations between ecological components. The second guiding concept, conscious power, brings to the
fore human agents’ distinctive capacity to produce our own subjective identity and the consequences of this capacity for social-ecological
organization. The third concept, congruence between subjective and objective dynamics, redefines sustainability as contingent on
congruent relations between material and symbolic processes. Social-ecological theories and analyses based on these three guiding
concepts would support the integration of current structuralist-functionalist methods, which sufficiently and appropriately characterize
ecological organization, with ethnographic and narrative methods exploring human intentionality, reflexivity, and biographical
development.
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INTRODUCTION
Look at these trees. Look at these birds in the sky.
Whenever I go to take care of the crops, I see that they
are in perfect harmony with nature. They have found their
place in the divine design. On the other hand, I have to
sweat to keep my life under control. For what reason do
the gods treat the birds and trees with so much more
generosity? Paulo Coelho, Dialogues with Buddha 
Social-ecological systems (SESs) are structurally determined by
cross-level and cross-scale interactions (Allen and Hoekstra 1992,
Gibson et al. 2000). In line with this, resilience thinking applies
system-based, structuralist, and functionalist frameworks that
originate in ecology, such as the adaptive cycle, to frame the
analysis of social-ecological dynamics. This reflects the
assumption that social and ecological self-organization are
isomorphic or equivalent, e.g., both made up of functional
components and relations, and therefore SESs are
organizationally homogeneous (Holling 2001, Low et al. 2003).
Such an assumption allows focusing on complex interactions,
involving for instance feedback loops or thresholds, between
organizationally equivalent components (or agents) be they
physical, biological, or human (Horan et al. 2011). Organizational
homogeneity effectively depicts nonhuman SESs, such as ant
colonies, or social-ecological situations where functionalist
models of the individual, e.g., rational-choice behavior, can
realistically characterize human agency (e.g., Miller and Page
2009), such as markets or resource-based situations with stable
rules. However, it fails to accommodate culture, politics, and
subjective processes associated with reflexivity and intentionality
(Manuel-Navarrete and Buzinde 2010, Brown and Westaway
2011). Subjectivity is particularly relevant in social-ecological
situations characterized by changing and ambiguous rules, where
individuals have the power to create new rules, reinterpret existing
rules, and reflexively transform their identity as a result. In this
paper I support a conceptualization of SESs based on
foregrounding organizational heterogeneity and the role of
subjectivity and reflexivity within these systems. This
foregrounding can potentially redirect resilience research agendas
toward: (1) incorporating sophisticated accounts of human
agents’ unique power to shape both symbolic and material
processes in SESs, (2) reconceptualizing social-ecological
coupling as an asymmetric process, and (3) redefining
sustainability as a measure of congruence between material and
symbolic processes.  
The study of human-environmental relations has long been a part
of cultural, human, and political ecology research traditions
(Hollingshead 1940, Turner 2002, Turner and Robbins 2008), as
well as of more applied research fields (e.g., Mazoyer and Roudart
2006). However, the formalization of the term “social-ecological
system” was explicitly formulated in late 1980s. Gallopín et al.
(1989) built on theories of dissipative structures (Nicolis and
Prigogine 1977) and resilience (Holling 1973) to describe “social-
ecological systems” as two subsystems connected through causal
circuits, including both human actions affecting ecological
subsystems as well as ecological effects on the social subsystem.
These authors described human actions as the sum of actions by
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diverse actors who are driven by specific motivations, hold
distinctive perceptions about the environment and are dependent
on social systems’ internal functioning. Gallopín et al.’s (1989)
original framework sought a balance between the two subsystems,
in an attempt to level them epistemologically. Their focus, which
subsequent researchers have followed, was on the exchanges and
feedbacks between the two subsystems, and the literature has
neglected to investigate whether these two subsystems might exist
in an embedded relationship. Moreover, even though the two
subsystems are presumed to be ontologically and epistemologically
equal, most analyses have privileged the ecological perspective
(Folke et al. 2011, Brown 2014).  
Early formalizations revealed problems with the demarcation of
SES boundaries. On the one hand, the two subsystems may not
match spatially, except perhaps in the case of homogeneous local
societies highly dependent on a single ecosystem as found on small
islands. On the other hand, social and ecological boundaries are
distinct in their determinants. Biophysical processes generally
define ecological (bona fide) boundaries, while human
demarcation defines social (fiat) boundaries (Smith and Varzi
2000). Subsequent elaborations have relied on the boundary of
one of the subsystems, usually the ecological one, to guide the
drawing of boundaries for a whole SES (Alessa et al. 2009). The
application of this ecological bias commonly starts with the
preanalytical choice of a specific ecosystem, or resource, as the
focal unit of analysis, proceeding to identification of the social
processes affecting the dynamics of the focal unit (Ostrom 2009).
In this way, researchers conceive of social processes and actions
as ecologically bounded by concepts such as a “community of
resource users” (Li 2001). This approach was popularized by
Berkes and Folke who concisely defined it as the “investigation
of social and ecological linkages in selected ecosystems” (Berkes
and Folke 1998:3). This extremely productive line of inquiry
bundles ecosystems, complexity theory, and resilience thinking
into the study of community-based conservation, local
governance, adaptation, and sustainability (Chapin et al. 2010).
However, the focus on ecosystems and natural resources severely
limits that which counts as social-ecological.  
Proposals to strengthen the analysis of the social side of resilience
have multiplied in the last decade (Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013,
Fabinyi et al. 2014). These proposals seek hybrid and more
evenhanded representations of SESs that combine mainstream
social-ecological knowledge with specific social science concepts
and approaches. For instance, Armitage et al. (2012) explore the
intersection between resilience and social well-being approaches.
These authors discuss the different emphases of each approach,
where social well-being emphasizes the material, relational, and
subjective aspects of people’s lives. They conclude that the
complementarity of social science and resilience approaches
allows a richer understanding of social-ecological complexity.
Similarly, Berkes and Ross (2013) investigate the common
conceptual ground between two established strands of research:
SES resilience, and the social sciences’ fields of psychology
development and mental health. These authors discuss and partly
integrate these two strands through an assessment of each strand’s
strengths and weaknesses in particular situations. These
proposals effectively combine key ecological and social concepts
and approaches but do not challenge nor revise ecologically biased
conceptualizations of SESs (Cote and Nightingale 2012,
Davidson 2013).  
I propose a conceptual strategy to overcome ecological biases
through (1) recognizing asymmetry as a main organizational
principle of social-ecological coupling and (2) highlighting the key
role of psychosocial and subjective dynamics in SESs (Trosper
2005, Brown and Westaway 2011). The three guiding concepts
presented below are introduced to reformulate SESs as doubly
coupled. On the one hand, there is material coupling between
ecological and social dynamics. This recognizes the physical basis
for social relations and the unavoidable constraints imposed on
them by human biology. On the other hand, these material social-
ecological dynamics are in turn coupled with subjective processes.
This recognizes that human purpose and its associated cognitive
dynamics are not entirely captured by biological and ecological
functioning.  
The paper starts by discussing each guiding concept to then
formulate an alternative way of representing social-ecological
organization in terms of double coupling. The first guiding
concept, social-ecological asymmetry, builds on Schneider and
Kay’s (1994) ecological applications of thermodynamics to
establish that, much as the capacity of ecological self-organization
to create persistent structures separates it from physical-chemical
self-organization, socio-cultural self-organization stands apart
from ecological self-organization because of reflexivity (Trosper
2005, Stengers 2010). The second concept, conscious power,
identifies self-awareness and reflexive agency as main driving forces
of social-ecological organization and change, and highlights the
need to effectively account for people’s perspectives and biographic
trajectories in SES theory and analysis. Conscious power points
to an agent’s capacity to purposefully seek a change of his or her
position in a social-ecological structure. Third, the concept of
congruence between objective and subjective dynamics establishes
that sustainability is an outcome of the interdependence between
external and intrapersonal processes. Thus, sustainability
approaches purely based on material outcomes or structural
change are significantly incomplete. Sustainability assessments
and interventions need to account for the coupling between
material-structural change, and the symbolic dynamics through
which human agents create meaning about their individual life
trajectories. This is consistent with resilience frameworks in which
sustainability is seen as implicating subjective preferences about
which system states are desirable (e.g., Carpenter et al. 2001).
ORGANIZATIONAL ASYMMETRY BETWEEN
ECOLOGICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL SUBSYSTEMS
Socio-cultural and ecological subsystems are not organizationally
equivalent because human agents shape social organization by
reflexive and relatively autonomous decisions made about
reproducing or challenging social rules. Ecological organization is
still mechanistic in the sense that it arises from the functional
interaction of the ecosystem’s components, each largely behaving
under given rules and according to genetically inherited attributes.
Unlike physical systems, the components of living systems create,
and are functionally dependent on, their ecological context, and
have little functional meaning outside that context (Rosen 1985).
Applications of nonequilibrium thermodynamics to biology and
ecology brought about new understandings of living systems as
dissipative structures that change irreversibly according to a certain
directionality or final causality (Jørgensen and Svirezhev 2004,
Stengers 2010). This understanding revealed that living systems
self-organize to harness and degrade available physical-chemical
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gradients of “exergy,” i.e., high quality/useful energy. Schneider
and Kay (1994) empirically explored the idea, which Polanyi
(1968) had originally devised, that ecological self-organization is
shaped by life’s need to impose sets of boundary conditions on
physical-chemical processes. Thus, the imposition of boundary
conditions with the final cause of harnessing energy and material
resources is a defining ability of living systems. Furthermore, the
drive to impose boundary conditions translates into the creation
of stable local states, ranging from organisms to whole
ecosystems, which allows living systems to stay temporarily away
from thermodynamic equilibrium (Allen et al. 2001).  
Living systems self-organize as a dissipative mechanism that
resists the “thermodynamic equilibrium movement,” which is
constantly pushing these systems away from self-produced and
locally stable states in which the system maximizes exergy
dissipation (Kay 2000, Fath et al. 2004). Exergy gradients also
sustain nonbiological self-organizing dissipative structures, e.g.,
tornadoes, but these abiotic structures cannot harness the
gradients that produce them to become locally stable. Living
systems are self-produced and capable of (1) incorporating matter
in the self-organizing process to sustain and create stable
dissipative structures, (2) using stored genetic information to
recreate self-organization without building it from zero after it
broke down, and (3) enhancing survivability by manipulating or
shaping exergy gradients and environments (Kay et al. 1999).
These unique capabilities mean that living systems operate
asymmetrically in relation to nonliving systems and at a higher
level of organization and complexity. Genetic memory sustains
the dissipative organization over time without having to restart
new dissipative events via stochastic environmental conditions.
Asymmetries manifest in new patterns of organization that are
consistent with, but irreducible and nonequivalent to, physical-
chemical patterns. In fact, living systems have evolved in ways that
ensure the sustainability of biological and ecological dissipative
structures in response to fluctuating environments. They can be
seen as dissipative pathways with encoded memories (Kay 2000).  
Acknowledgment of asymmetrical relations between physical-
chemical and ecological self-organization has been fundamental
for resilience thinking (Levin 1998). Building on the empirical
observation that ecosystems capture more energy and make better
use of it as they mature, Schneider and Kay (1994) hypothesized
that ecosystems self-organize and “ecologically evolve” in the
direction of finding better and faster ways of dissipating available
exergy gradients (Minkel 2002). Although Darwinist evolution
may apply to organizationally closed organisms, evolution cannot
select for ecosystems in the way it selects for genetically encoded
organisms. However, this does not mean that ecological self-
organization is purely stochastic, or mechanistic, in the same sense
as storms or lasers (Kay 2000). Physical-chemical self-
organization is reactive and ephemeral; it spontaneously emerges
in the presence of exergy gradients, in fact, as the direct
consequence of these gradients. “Lower” physical-chemical
organization is not less important or fundamental, but its
dynamics are simpler because of lesser autonomy from the
environment. Physical-chemical systems do not evolve because
their organization is contingent upon a specific environmental
gradient and does not persist once that gradient dissipates.  
It is ironic that although resilience thinking builds on the
recognition of organizational asymmetry between living and
nonliving systems, it has failed to recognize a parallel asymmetry
between ecological and social domains. This recognition is
perhaps hindered by the fact that some invertebrate species, such
as ants or bees, display (biologically determined) social behavior.
However, these basic forms of social interaction are not equivalent
to socio-cultural dynamics supported by symbolic processes that
are embodied in self-conscious beings. As argued by Polanyi way
before the popularization of resilience thinking: “[O]nce it is
recognized [...] that life transcends physics and chemistry, there is
no reason for suspending recognition of the obvious fact that
consciousness is a principle that fundamentally transcends not
only physics and chemistry but also the mechanistic principles of
living beings.” (1968:1310). Resilience and Holling’s (1973)
adaptive cycles have a heuristic value to explore structural
dynamics in SESs, yet the extrapolation of ecological resilience
to socio-cultural systems, and by extension to SESs as a whole,
requires caution. Resilience researchers have recently started to
acknowledge the need for more sophisticated theoretical and
analytical distinctions between the two subsystems. The full
theoretical and practical consequences of such distinctions,
however, are yet to be explored (Crane 2010, Davidson 2010, Cote
and Nightingale 2012). Even though Holling (2001) correctly
identified foresight, intentionality, communication, and
technology as unique to human systems, resilience scholars have
overlooked the theoretical and methodological challenges of
applying the adaptive cycle and panarchy models to asymmetric
social-ecological systems. Perhaps influenced by systems thinking
epistemologies (e.g., Checkland 1981) the dominant assumption
is that both ecological and social systems are adaptive systems
composed of functional parts properly linked to others.  
As all organisms, human agents must survive and be materially
viable and resilient, but they do so in accordance with symbolic
and meaningful structures or schemes partly of their own
devising. Meaning-symbolic structures emerge from cognitive
processes and provide the basis of socio-cultural self-
organization. This does not mean that ecological organization or
nonreflexive species are of less value. In fact, they are more
fundamental because they provide the material basis for the
emergence of the symbolic dimension. However, reflexivity
provides individual agents with unique powers to autonomously
rethink and intentionally influence material structures, hence
creating an asymmetric coupling. For instance, human agents are
particularly competent to (1) simultaneously occupy multiple
positions in social-ecological structures, (2) change positions or
reset the functions attributed to each position, and (3) make some
positions or functions evolve into something else. Structuralist or
functionalist frameworks of analysis, which might explain
ecological resilience, do not suffice for social-ecological
organization because of the variability and fluidity that originate
from reflexive agency (Trosper 2005, Manuel-Navarrete and
Buzinde 2010).
CONSCIOUS POWER
Social-ecological institutional analysis focuses on human
behavior, decision making, and material outcomes. A major
concern is to develop a broad theory of how humans tend to
behave in diverse ecological situations. However, this is
challenging because humans do not have fixed characteristics;
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they adapt and change over time (Ostrom 2005). The concept of
conscious power departs from a focus on situational behavior to
emphasize human capacities to consciously shape the situations
in which they operate and behave. As conscious beings we have
freedom to shape our mental processes, which endows us with
autonomy to influence SESs symbolically and materially.
Intention, purposiveness, and even emotions are not exclusively
human experiences because some forms of nonhuman animals
can and do have a role in the formulation of their individuality.
However, human subjectivity includes individuals’ ability to
design and strategically change social rules with the goal of
shaping the power relations that impinge upon them (Lotka 1945,
d’Aquino and Bah 2013). Therefore, subjectivity includes the
political aim of influencing structural change in a desired
direction. Although biophysical structures make human cognitive
abilities possible, biophysics does not entirely dictate our cognitive
pathways (Dennett 1993). Rather intrapersonal forces such as the
meaning of life-long trajectories, or the coherence of our life
stories, which we build ourselves through experiencing the world,
feed subjectivities and help shape who we become (Archer 2003).  
Recognizing the key influence of conscious power further
challenges structuralist biases in social-ecological research.
Representing social systems through sets of positions and rules
of interaction tends to support functionalist analyses that,
although useful to simulate outcomes, overlook the subjective and
political processes involved in the creation and evolution of these
positions and rules. Common pool resource (CPR) literature has
effectively developed functionalist representations via the “action
situation” construct. The Institutional Analysis and Development
Framework (IAD) is a popular framework in CPR literature that
conceptualizes human agents as actors operating in action
situations (Ostrom 2005). These actors assess the outcomes that
result from using resources and interacting with other actors, and
decide whether to comply with existing rules, or not, to maximize
preferred outcomes. Successful CPR systems are those that
establish rules (and incentives to comply with these rules) that
lead to interactions and behaviors that, subsequently, yield
sustainable outcomes. Operational-level analysis has proven
effective in modeling traditional resource-based systems highly
dependent on local ecosystems that are characterized by relatively
slow change. However, politics and culture affect even the simplest
CPR system, including, for example, ethnic, gender, and caste
identities of participants (Agrawal 2003). The cultural and
political contexts of action situations were part of the IAD
framework since its inception (Ostrom 1990), but they have
slipped out of focus over time despite their particular prominence
in intensely humanized and highly complex SESs such as urban
or agriculture systems (Clement 2013).  
Social-ecological research needs to include the ethnographic and
narrative study of agents’ life trajectories, including deliberate
involvement in the construction of identities and social positions.
In turn, social researchers need to explore ways of objectivizing
the subjective dimension, without obliterating the subject, and
provide general rules about meaning-making processes so that
subjectivity can be effectively integrated within systems research.
As Bromley (2012) suggests: “it is the social construction of that
ecosystem—its shared mental objectification—that will be
decisive in terms of institutional arrangements for addressing
issues of global governance.” Promising developments in this
direction include the study of “mind maps” and “mental models”
(Glaser 2006, Jones et al. 2014). The concept of conscious power
emphasizes that individual humans are constantly free to
challenge social structures both explicitly through political action,
and implicitly through the construction of subjectivities.
Identities and social positions are not relatively stable starting
points from which a system’s self-organization unfolds. Instead,
change and development in identities and positions occur
habitually, rapidly, and unpredictably, as part of the very process
of social-ecological organization. Changes in individual or
collective identities have a subjective component. That is, they
involve individual or collective subjects who are faced with fields
of power within which they may choose and realize several
identifications. However, subjective choices are not independent
from material and informational dynamics within SESs.  
Conscious power is not the only cognitive force influencing SESs’
dynamics (Beratan 2007). Unconscious cognitive power can be
formulated as a fundamental force of biological and social
organization that is exerted by all sentient beings. Unconscious
cognitive processes were central to both Bateson’s “ecology of
mind” (1972), and Maturana and Varela’s systems perspective on
biology and cognition (1980). For Bateson (1972), unconscious
“mental” processes organize the entire living world and allow for
the coupling between organisms and systems. In his view, all
organisms and systems are “minds” capable of unconscious
cognition. Bateson’s biologistic explanation of human-
environmental coupling turns my concept of social-ecological
asymmetry upside-down. He downplays consciousness by
arguing that it is a limited and biased component of our larger
unconscious mind. Consciousness cannot ensure the coupling of
humans and environment because it is only capable of processing
partial and distorted (subjective?) information. Only unconscious
mental processes have access to the “evolutionary wisdom” that
enable from organisms to systems to adapt to environmental
stimuli through coordinating physiological, genetic, behavioral,
or functional responses.  
Maturana and Varela (1980) proposed that cognition is not
exclusive to the brain, mind, or consciousness, but a quality of
life itself. They explained living systems as the product of
reciprocal relationships between (1) an organism’s internal
organization and (2) the need to maintain structural coherence
with the environment. In this view, all organisms generate
“meaning” as they establish viable patterns of interaction with
the environment by regularly responding to stimuli and
phenomena (see also Lewontin 1998). At the same time
consciousness is a particular form of cognition that cannot be
reduced to neuronal processes or nervous system dynamics
(Thompson and Varela 2001). According to Maturana (2008),
human consciousness is related to our ability to use language to
refer to entities that are external to us. As “languaging beings” we
have the power to generate “any new world that we may language
into existence” (Maturana 2002:30). Consciousness emerges
through our recursive and reciprocal interrelationships with our
environment as we imagine alternative configurations of
interrelationships and choose which ones to realize.  
The idea of reciprocal interactions between organisms and
environment does not imply symmetry (Thompson and Varela
2001). Maturana and Varela’s (1980) approach to consciousness
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is consistent with the idea of double coupling presented in this
paper. On the one hand, these authors challenge any rigid
boundaries between biology and consciousness, but on the other
hand they acknowledge that consciousness is an emergent process
conferring some autonomy on self-conscious beings, be they
human, primates, or dolphins. The point here is that we are both
self-conscious, and material. Our materiality makes us transitory
while “self-consciousness is the opening for reflective autonomy
and freedom” (Maturana 2002:31). The autonomy of intra-
subjective processes from social-ecological materiality problematizes
our understanding of how social-ecological coupling actually
works. If  subjectivity is an emergent phenomenon, then what role
does it play in the coupling (or decoupling) of social and ecological
processes? Which aspects of social organization can become truly
autonomous from ecological processes? Which ones are
structurally constrained or somehow determined by material
processes?
SUSTAINABILITY AND CONGRUENCE BETWEEN
SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE DYNAMICS
The two concepts discussed above invite understandings of social-
ecological sustainability that focus on the challenge of maintaining
congruence across asymmetrical levels of organization; that is,
across subsystems that change according to distinctive
organizational principles. Resilience scholars have contributed to
system-based conceptualizations of sustainability. They assess the
sustainability of different types of SESs in terms of system
properties. These properties include adaptability; the system’s
capacity to remain in a “good” stability domain, i.e., “good
resilience,” as well as the system’s transformability or capacity to
shift in directions that get it out of a rigidity trap, i.e., “bad
resilience,” while preserving its identity (Olsson et al. 2014).
However, the question of what states or transformations should
count as sustainable (for whom?) cannot be objectively resolved
by merely invoking generic systems’ functions (Trosper 2005). A
system’s capacity to deal with future disruptive change or to
respond to new opportunities is hardly ever desirable for everyone.
Social-ecological sustainability requires incorporating into the
analysis subjective ideas about what counts as desirable change.
Incorporating this subjective dimension would contribute to the
avoidance of fair criticisms that applying functional systems’
properties, such as resilience, to social subsystems leads to
unwarranted emphases on consensus, agreement, harmony, and
compatibility, while downplaying conflict (Hornborg 2009).
Furthermore, as discussed in the previous section, human agents
can consciously seek to steer a SES (Trosper 2005). We need to
understand the role that thoughts and feelings about desirable and
sustainable states and pathways play in system-level dynamics
(Hukkinen 2012). Such thoughts and feelings are themselves
dynamic, changing subjectively along the autobiographic
development of autonomous agents who are constantly interacting
(and struggling) with other agents and their environment (Manuel-
Navarrete 2013). The concept of congruence between subjective
and objective dynamics highlights that sustainability transcends
materiality.  
Social-ecological institutional analysts conceptualize sustainability
in terms of outcomes from actions situations (Ostrom 2005). A
main goal is to avert “perverse outcomes.” Perversity evokes the
idea of being unacceptable, as well as unintended and undesired.
However, there are no universal standards of acceptability and
desirability. Power relations, conflict, and the subjective process
through which different actors may determine what is acceptable,
desirable, sustainable, or perverse need to be brought to the fore.
Neither social-ecological institutional analysts nor resilience
scholars have focused their analytical lenses on the genesis of
preferences, political processes, or the subjective dynamics as
vigorously as social sciences have. One notable exception is
Agrawal’s Foucauldian exploration of environmental subjectivities
in the context of CPR analysis (Agrawal 2005). The concept of
congruence between subjective and objective dynamics seeks to
support a more integrated framework that defines sustainability
as the interplay of ecological, operational, political, cultural, and
personal dynamics (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. Organizational congruence between asymmetric
dynamics in social-ecological systems.
Sustainability science has implicitly recognized social-ecological
congruence, typically framing it as the gap between knowledge
(symbolic dimension) and action (material dimension; van
Kerkhoff and Lebel 2006). Resilience scholars have also
addressed aspects of social-ecological congruence through the
investigation of “fit” between institutions and ecosystems (Folke
et al. 2007, Farrell and Thiel 2013). “Fit” refers to the congruence
of ecological dynamics with institutional arrangements.
Resilience scholars propose that adaptively realigning governance
structures will address the incongruence (e.g., Olsson et al. 2007).
However, social-ecological congruence also depends on political
and cultural processes giving rise to specific sustainability
challenges, e.g., social inequality, beyond institutional fit. For
instance, members of a fishing community may also be members
of the community’s municipal government, as well as an ethnic
or religious cohort. In such cases, they will need to find ways of
making these multiple positions and identities somehow
congruent, thus bringing the problem of fit to the intra-personal
dimension (Hukkinen 2012). Few ecological systems have these
blurring of levels (though an omnivore may occupy several
positions in a trophic chain). Biological organisms attain
structural and functional congruence with the ecosystem as a
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result of their evolutionary development as a species, and for the
most part independently of individual life trajectories (Stengers
2010).  
The mobility and conscious power of humans within social-
ecological systems pose special analytical challenges for
sustainability because of the multiple forms of congruence that
are required to reconcile tensions arising from competing
identities and subjectivities, changing positions, and simultaneously
holding multiple positions. Social-ecological research needs to
identify, describe, and measure these (in)congruencies (Bromley
2012). Autobiographical and ethnographic research needs to be
effectively combined with system-level research. An adjustment
of the major research questions asked might also be suitable. For
instance, questions about material sustainability can be
complemented with the interrogation of what it means to live a
sustainable life in terms of the type of relationship that one has
to establish to oneself. Life stories may provide valuable accounts
of agency and data about an agent’s dynamic structural
congruence within SESs. Individual development in humans is
not random, or overwhelmingly determined by genetics and
environmental structures (Lewontin 1998). Individuals improvise
their identities as they make their way through the world.
Sustainability depends on the ability of both nonhuman and
human agents to create congruent relations within and between
levels of organization. In the social subsystem, congruence may
be as much symbolic as material (Crane 2010). It depends on
reflexivity and the ability of human agents to internally reconcile
their material interactions. As we make decisions and take actions
we build (in)congruence among (1) personal trajectories of
identification, (2) the requirements of our social position that we
may have contributed to create and shape, (3) the requirements
of positions to which we aspire and (4) coupled ecological and
social dynamics in which we participate.
DOUBLE SOCIAL-ECOLOGICAL COUPLING
The three concepts introduced in this paper challenge symmetric
representations of social-ecological coupling. Figure 2 depicts the
basic structure of double coupling. This structure includes
symmetric (horizontal) coupling made of material as well as
informational processes (Fig. 2, A), and asymmetric (vertical)
coupling between material, and symbolic-subjective processes.
The former includes what Archer (1995:180) calls systems
“without a knowing subject,” in which information can be
separated from those who know it. The former is “culture with a
knowing subject”; framed by people’s biographies and the power
relations within which subjectivities are embedded. On the
upward direction of asymmetric coupling, individuals interact
with material systems to actualize personal meaning systems
about the relational matrix within which their lives unfold (Fig,
2, B). The outcome is “subjective experience,” or the ways in which
people come to think of themselves, others, and the material. This
subjective experience is mediated by the “stories told” (to
ourselves and others) “in natural language,” and by “reflexivity.”
On the downward direction (Fig. 2, C), consent or dissent with
material regimes is a matter of choice and political action (of
“human agency”) when regimes are nontotalitarian. Social-
ecological models (Fig. 2, D) are symbolic-scientific systems that
seek to mimic the observed, or hypothesized, material dimension
of actual SESs in, debatably, objective ways (Rosen 1985). Thus,
these models effectively underplay the role of subjectivity in both
observed social-ecological dynamics, and the very practice of
modeling these dynamics. However, model outcomes have to be
typically translated into stories to enter vertical coupling and have
material effects via human agency.
Fig. 2. Schematic representation of double coupling in social-
ecological systems.
We influence social-ecological systems through our behavior, but
also through the stories we tell (Geertz 1984, Goldstein et al.
2015). Doubly coupled social-ecological systems imply
interdependencies between inner world, e.g., dreams, fantasies, or
emotional responses, and outer world, e.g. social and biophysical
phenomena. Social-ecological researchers need to link the intra-
personal, e.g., a particular trajectories unique to a person, with
the material unfolding of interacting living and social systems
(Manuel-Navarrete et al. 2004). Persons are not exclusively
bounded, unique, cognitively integrated entities or utterly
constructed by social discourse and biophysical processes. Instead
we are relatively autonomous, but fundamentally coupled to
material social-ecological dynamics.  
Figure 2 does not pretend to provide a final, universal
representation of double coupling. Resilience scholars can draw
on social theory and philosophical debates for alternatives that
may fit the needs of each particular case. Formalizing social-
ecological systems as doubly coupled entails a more nuanced
consideration of the role of the observer, including scientists
(Allen et al. 2001). Resilience thinking has greatly contributed to
our capacity to interpret and engage with social-ecological
complexity, e.g., promoting nonlinear thinking, and new ways of
acting upon these subjective capacities, e.g., supporting adaptive
management. Acknowledging asymmetrical coupling may help
to underscore the fact that resilience scholars are subjects,
inherently involved in the social-ecological dynamics they study.
CONCLUSIONS
Social-ecological resilience research can benefit from explicitly
distinguishing ecological self-organization, which is driven by a
combination of thermodynamic laws and functional networking,
and socio-cultural self-organization, which is driven by socio-
psychological factors. Resilience is a functional property that
provides ecosystems with stability in the face of environmental
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change. Schneider and Kay (1994) found that ecosystems
inherently seek stability via their propensity to dissipate as much
exergy as possible, which in turn promotes species survivability
and the systems’ sustainability. The idea that we can promote
ecological sustainability through managing ecosystems’ resilience
revamped conservation science and practice. Initial excitement
led to a sweeping extension of resilience concepts to SESs in
general, but thermodynamic laws do not structure social systems
in the way that they structure ecological systems. The internal
organization of SESs is asymmetrical because social dynamics
depend on subjective processes through which human agents can
consciously aim to steer the overall system. However, this steering
is often nondeterministic and cannot be conceptualized entirely
through reference to system function. It is self-reflexive, and
dialectical, the result of humans acting through opposing forces.
Dialectically opposing forces may result from conflicting
individual intentions, i.e., political processes, which are
themselves constantly changing through self-reflexive choices in
the course of one’s own life, i.e., biographical development. At
the same time, political processes and identity-formation change
the rules governing operational situations, as well as the
configuration of ecological, biological, and physical processes
constraining these situations. Sustaining productive interrelations
across asymmetrical levels requires self-constraint from higher
levels to ensure a minimum degree of congruence with lower levels.
Completely incongruent relations are unsustainable in the sense
that higher-level entities become nonviable, whether they are
individual human agents, governance regimes or entire cultural
systems.  
The three concepts presented in this paper support an
asymmetrical conceptualization of social-ecological coupling.
Traditional conceptualizations focus on relations between
material and informational aspects. However, social organization
cannot be reduced to material and biological processes. It involves
subjective dynamics that are asymmetrically coupled with the
biophysical world in the same way that ecological processes are
with physical-chemical subsystems governed by the laws of
thermodynamics. The centrality of power, agency and socio-
cultural heterogeneity in social human systems requires methods
of analysis that transcend system-level structuralist analysis and
situational approaches. The concept of congruence is introduced
here to characterize the sustainability of dynamics occurring
across asymmetrical levels of organization. The sustainability of
symmetrically coupled systems is a property of the coupling itself.
As implied by the work of Maturana and Varela (1980),
congruence between symmetrically coupled subsystems is
determined by their internal structures that have evolved in the
context of the very coupling. This structural determinism,
however, does not apply to asymmetrically coupled systems in
which the internal structures of higher levels are emergent and
relatively autonomous from lower level dynamics. Thompson and
Varela (2001:421) argued that this form of coupling is a
“reciprocal (but not symmetrical) relationship between global and
local levels” through which the emergent, global level institutes
its own domain of interaction.  
Although ecological structures seem to “evolve” toward
optimizing the dissipation of available exergy (Schneider and Kay
1994), socio-cultural self-organization is driven by symbolic
processes that change more rapidly, with higher freedom to
rearrange, recombine, and create new components. Even though
biological and ecological functions determine some human
cognitive capacities, socio-cultural organization emerges from
symbolic dynamics barely influenced by biophysical processes.
Human consciousness forms from the course of making our way
through the world as individual subjects. Subjective individual
freedom is a manifestation of our consciousness, reflexivity, and
ability to maintain internal conversations about ourselves, as well
as about the structures present and trajectories taking place at the
objective level.  
Sustainability in asymmetrically coupled systems requires
minimum levels of congruence that must be initiated and
instituted from higher levels. It is about balancing the new
opportunities offered by human autonomy with the risks of losing
sight that human autonomy can only flourish in the long run if
it entails subjective processes that are congruently coupled with
social-ecological materiality. Sustainable pathways can be
understood to emerge when meaningful personal trajectories are
sufficiently congruent with underlying material and informational
dynamics. Making these pathways congruent may involve
fostering social or ecological resilience at the material level, but
it may also require ending resilience to open up opportunities for
new socio-cultural processes that are both meaningful and
materially sound.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/7720
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